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 Abstract 
Cultural bias means individuals judge and interpret a phenomenon according to values 
that are inherent in their own culture. The same event may be perceived differently by 
individuals with different cultural backgrounds. This study systematically tests for the 
presence of cultural differences in the perception of foreign policy events. Using a web 
survey with a split-sample of Chinese and US foreign policy experts, four domains of 
foreign policy are explored: sanctions; border violations; foreign aid; and trade 
agreements. The findings indicate general agreement between Chinese and US experts 
in the classification of foreign-policy events as cooperative, neutral, or conflictive. In 
regard to more specific foreign-policy scenarios, the picture is more differentiated. In 
the case of economic sanctions and border violations, there appears, again, to be 
general agreement as to the degree of conflictiveness of these events. In addition, 
perception does not appear to be influenced by collective self-esteem, in the sense 
that responses remain similar whether the event is described in abstract or country-
specific terms. In the case of trade agreements and foreign aid, by contrast, there is a 
divergence in Chinese and US perceptions in regard to contextual factors such as 
conditionality and enforcement. Overall, the study suggests that while culture rarely 
affects the general perception of foreign-policy events, it does play a role in the 
perception of more complex concepts, such as conditionality and enforcement, that 
structure the context and meaning of those events. 
Keywords  
Cultural bias, international cooperation, international conflict, foreign policy, event 
perception  
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Cultural Bias in the Perception of Foreign-
Policy Events * 
 
Felix S. Bethke 
 
1 Introduction 
On 1 April 2001, a Chinese fighter-plane collided with a US surveillance aircraft in 
the airspace over the South China Sea. The US plane was forced to land on the 
Chinese island of Hainan without first seeking permission from the ground. The 
Chinese pilot died in the incident. The US crew were detained by the Chinese, who 
demanded an apology from the US authorities. The Americans refused, claiming 
that the collision was an accident, but in order to resolve the dispute they 
acknowledged ‘regret’ at the incident and the resultant harm. Following this, on 11 
April 2001, the crew were released. In the aftermath of the incident, Chinese and 
US government officials put different spins on the story, with the Chinese claiming 
to have extracted an apology from the United States, and thus to have secured a 
diplomatic victory, and the Americans denying that their statement of regret 
amounted to a formal diplomatic note of apology. The Hainan incident marked the 
start of an ongoing series of clashes between the United States and China in the 
region of the South China Sea.1 
                                                          
 * I am grateful to Rainer Baumann, Stephen Brown, David Carment, and Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 
and likewise all those who took part in the research colloquium at the Centre for Global 
Cooperation Research, for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks 
must go to Manjiao Chi for his help with the Chinese translation of the questionnaire. For help 
with the pre-testing of the questionnaire, I would like to thank all the staff of the Centre for 
Global Cooperation Research, and in particular Uwe Amerkamp. I would also like to thank Jay 
Ullfelder and Patricia Lee for local testing of the web-survey. Gisela Wohlfahrt provided 
excellent research assistance. 
 1  Near-collisions between US and Chinese ships in the South China Sea in Mar. 2009 and Dec. 
2013 also raised diplomatic tensions (Perlez 2013; Tyson 2009). In 2010, at the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the US had a national 
interest in ‘freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for 
international law in the South China Sea’ (US Department of State 2010). In May 2015, Ashton 
Carter, US Defense Secretary, warned China to stop its construction of man-made islands in 
the region (Whitlock 2015). Chinese officials, for their part, have issued repeated protests 
about US surveillance activity in the area (Blanchard and Stewart 2011; Hennigan 2014). On 21 
July 2015, for example, a Chinese military official complained that ‘[f]or a long time, US 
military ships and aircraft have carried out frequent, widespread, and up-close surveillance of 
China, seriously harming bilateral mutual trust and China’s security interests, which could 
easily cause an accident at sea or in the air’ (Farley 2015). 
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The stance taken by most foreign-policy experts, academics, and pundits on the 
Hainan crisis was to view it as an example of conflict arising from culturally 
divergent perceptions—both of events in general and of the need for apology in 
particular (Gries 2009; Gries and Peng 2002; Huang and Bedford 2009; Nisbett 
2003: 197–8; Slingerland, Blanchard, and Boyd-Judson 2007; Zhang 2001a).2 As 
Gries and Peng (2002) have shown, whereas the Americans repeatedly stressed the 
accidental nature of the event, the Chinese were not concerned about the 
immediate cause. To them, what mattered was the bigger picture, namely 1) that 
the United States had been spying on China and 2) that harm had been inflicted. In 
other words, intentionality was of secondary interest to the Chinese but was a 
major consideration for the Americans, a fact that would seem to indicate the 
presence of cultural bias in the perception of the event. Cultural bias can be said to 
occur when individuals form an opinion about a particular phenomenon on the 
basis of values intrinsic to their own culture. The same phenomenon may thus be 
perceived differently by individuals with different cultural backgrounds (Douglas 
2011[1982]). Culturally based disjunctures in the perception of events or behaviour 
do not just cause conflict between states; they also hamper global cooperation on 
the provision of public goods—the global effort to mitigate climate change, for 
example, or to eradicate disease. If those charged with negotiating on global issues 
do not have a common understanding of the problems under discussion, global 
cooperation is doomed to fail.3 
The study presented here systematically tests for the presence of cultural 
difference in the perception of foreign-policy events. Using a web survey with a 
split sample of Chinese and US foreign-policy experts, it explores four domains of 
foreign policy: sanctions; border violations; foreign aid; and trade agreements. The 
findings indicate general agreement between Chinese and US experts in the 
classification of foreign-policy events as cooperative, neutral, or conflictive. In 
regard to more specific foreign-policy scenarios, the picture is more differentiated. 
In the case of economic sanctions and border violations, there appears, again, to be 
general agreement as to the degree of conflictiveness. In addition, perception does 
not appear to be influenced by collective self-esteem, in the sense that responses 
remain similar whether the events were described in abstract or country-specific 
terms. In the area of foreign aid, by contrast, there is a divergence in Chinese and 
US perceptions in regard to conditionality: if financial assistance is tied to structural 
adjustment and the imposition of austerity-measures, the Chinese experts view it 
as substantially less cooperative in character than when it is offered without these 
conditions; for the US experts, however, this distinction is of minor importance. 
Cultural differences are also detectable in the perception of trade agreements: 
Chinese respondents are less likely to recommend entering into such an agreement 
if it includes an enforcement mechanism, whereas for US respondents the presence 
of such an element enhances the appeal of joining. 
                                                          
 2 A number of opinion pieces in US newspapers (Butterfield 2001; Wright 2001) and a report by 
the US Library of Congress (Kan et al. 2001: 13) also stressed the important role played by 
differences in the political cultures of the two countries in escalating the crisis. 
 3 The nature of cultural diversity as both a challenge to, and an opportunity for, global 
cooperation is discussed in detail by Scholte and colleagues (2015). 
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Overall, then, the study suggests that while culture rarely affects the general 
perception of foreign-policy events, it does play a role in the perception of more 
complex concepts, such as conditionality and enforcement, that structure the 
context and meaning of those events. 
In the sections that follow, I review the literature on culture and foreign policy 
(Sect. 2) and propose a theory of culture and event perception (Sect. 3). I then set 
out the reasons underlying the selection of the United States and China as 
appropriate cases for the investigation of the role of cultural difference in event 
perception (Sect. 4). This is followed by a description of the questionnaire used in 
the study (Sect. 5) and details of the survey design and participating foreign-policy 
experts (Sect. 6). The results of the empirical analysis are then presented (Sect. 7) 
and the paper concludes with a discussion of the findings (Sect. 8). 
2 Related Literature 
The study of culture has a long tradition in international politics. This point is 
made by, amongst others, Krause, who notes the way in which scholars down the 
ages have been mindful of ‘the impact of the national differences that negotiators 
brought to the table’ (Krause: 1999: 1).4 Despite this enduring interest, within 
dominant IR theories, cultural influences on foreign-policy behaviour were long 
neglected, or regarded as of no more than marginal significance. Within the 
framework of the prevailing account, which saw international politics as being 
shaped by the relative material capabilities of states and by the structure of the 
international system in general and the bipolar Cold-War configuration in particular 
(Hudson: 1997: 1; Katzenstein: 1996: 2), the cultural specifics of nations appeared 
irrelevant. Building on the rational-choice paradigm, IR theories adhered to a 
‘rational actor’ model of state behaviour (see, for example, Keohane: 1984; Waltz: 
1979) in which states were assumed to be monolithic, unitary actors that made 
rational decisions aimed at maximizing utility to themselves. In this scheme, 
decision-making in international politics was assumed to involve five steps: 1) the 
identification and prioritization of goals; 2) the search for alternatives; 3) prediction 
of the consequences of each alternative; 4) the ranking of each alternative 
according to utility (in other words, how well it matches up to goals and interests); 
and 5) selection of the alternative that would maximize utility (Allison and Zelikow 
1999: 13–26; Bueno de Mesquita 2009; Kahler 1998). The cultural characteristics of 
nations, if considered at all, were treated as a residual category: what could not be 
explained by the model must be a result of, or driven by, the cultural norms of the 
states involved (Hudson and Sampson III 1999). 
Since the end of the Cold War, however, there has been a growth in interest in 
the cultural drivers of international politics and foreign-policy behaviour across 
multiple subfields (Hudson 1997; Johnston 1995; Katzenstein 1996; Krause 1999; 
Lapid and Kratochwil 1996). Scholars have set about analysing the influence of 
culture in areas such as conflict resolution between states (Avruch 1998; Brigg and 
                                                          
 4 For a comprehensive account of developments in this area, see Reeves (2004). 
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Muller 2009), international negotiations (Cohen 2004; Faure and Rubin 1993; Fisher 
1997[1988]), and peacekeeping operations (Rubinstein 1993). Most prominently, 
Samuel Huntington cited cultural difference as the main explanatory variable in 
what he termed the ‘clash of civilizations’ (1996; 1993). Huntington essentially 
argued that, because of geopolitical developments after the end of the Cold War, 
conflicts would now be triggered not by ideological or economic cleavages 
between nations but by cultural differences, and most notably religious 
differences, between whole civilizations (Huntington 1993: 22). 
Other culturally based explanations of foreign-policy behaviour were advanced 
under the analytical category of ‘strategic culture’, a term which generally 
encompassed all country-specific characteristics that might influence the strategic 
behaviour of states in international politics. Early work on this topic, in the 1970s 
and1980s, looked at the way in which cultural history had shaped the strategic pre-
dispositions of the United States (Lord 1985) and the Soviet Union (Snyder 1977). 
During the 1990s, scholars such as Johnston (1995) and Legro (1996) developed a 
systematic analytical framework for the strategic-culture approach, drawing on 
rational-choice and game-theory models of foreign-policy decision-making. 
Johnston (1995: 46) defined strategic culture as ‘an ideational milieu which limits 
behavioral choices’, the implication of which was that cultural systems shaped the 
preferences of states in international affairs. Scholars working with the concept of 
strategic culture thus attempted to incorporate cultural difference into the 
rational-actor model of foreign-policy behaviour, with culture influencing decision-
making in (at least) three ways: firstly by determining the alternatives amongst 
which decision-makers can choose; secondly by shaping decision-makers’ 
predictions about the expected consequences of each alternative (in situations of 
strategic interaction this usually means how other states will respond to the 
alternatives in question); and thirdly by affecting the expected-utility rankings for 
each alternative. In combination, these three elements of strategic culture create 
the possibility that two decision-makers will act differently in regard to the same 
situation because of differences in their cultural backgrounds.5 Using the strategic-
culture framework, Legro (1996) showed, firstly, how the short-list of aerial-
warfare options from which British leaders could choose in the fight against 
Germany in World War II was determined by the organizational culture of the Royal 
Air Force and, secondly, how this same culture influenced the British decision to 
opt for strategic bombing. In similar vein, Johnston (1996), in his analysis of Chinese 
foreign policy, demonstrated how a historically rooted strategic culture persisted 
beyond the Maoist period, influencing a whole range of decisions.6 
Culturally based accounts of foreign policy also feature in constructivist IR theory 
(Katzenstein 1996; Lapid and Kratochwil 1996). Scholars working within this 
framework are generally concerned either with the process by which norms7 are 
                                                          
 5 The idea of decision-makers operating in line with differing strategic cultures is at odds with 
the rational-choice model in general and game theory in particular in that these approaches 
assume a common understanding of preferences, alternatives, and utility pay-offs. 
 6 For contemporary accounts of US strategic culture, see Harris (2014) and O’Reilly (2013). On 
China’s strategic culture, see Scobell (2014). 
 7 In the generally accepted sense of ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors’ 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891), where ‘actors’ in this case refers to nation states. 
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constructed by international organizations and disseminated amongst their 
members (Finnemore 1993) or with the construction and evolution of the culture of 
the international system of states as a whole (see, for example, Wendt’s ‘three 
cultures of anarchy’: Wendt 1999: 246–313). What they are seeking to explain, 
therefore, is the emergence of a global culture of norms.8 A number of 
constructivist scholars, however, have advanced the idea of national security 
cultures as frameworks through which ‘identities and norms influence the ways in 
which actors define their interests’ (Katzenstein 1996: 30). By highlighting the part 
played by states’ identities in shaping foreign-policy behaviour, constructivists also 
point up the mechanisms by which culture operates in this area. Jepperson and 
colleagues, for example, define identity as a set of ‘mutually constructed and 
evolving images of self and other’ (Jepperson et al. 1996: 59), meaning how states 
perceive themselves in relation to other states.9 Since cultural characteristics are 
part of that self-perception, it follows that if identity influences foreign-policy 
behaviour, so too does culture. These constructivists see state identity as 
generating and shaping foreign-policy interests (Jepperson, Wendt, and 
Katzenstein 1996: 60), but unlike scholars of strategic culture, they regard that 
identity as being socially constructed prior to any definition of state interests in 
terms of preferences and utility (Kahler 1998: 936). Applying the concept of socially 
constructed state identity, Berger (1996) documents the post-World War II 
evolution of Germany into a pacified, democratic, internationalized state and the 
major influence this had in shaping its foreign-policy interests in the realm of 
national security. Uemura (2015) uses a cultural-constructivist approach in 
explaining the influence which China’s cultural behaviour-patterns had in shaping 
its identity vis-à-vis Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. One major 
factor here was the tradition of guanxi, which lays stress on reciprocity. 
Despite their conceptual and analytical differences, most theoretical approaches 
identify culture as a variable that determines differences in cognition—in other 
words, differences in the way decision-makers reason about foreign-policy choices 
or perceive the international system and other states. Drawing on concepts and 
methods from cognitive psychology, scholars are increasingly turning to empirical 
analysis to document the ways in which culture influences perception of actors, 
events, and behaviour in international politics. It was in this connection that 
Hudson (1999) advanced the idea of culturally based action templates. An action 
template is essentially a set of expectations as to how the policy-makers of a given 
country are likely to act in a particular situation. Such templates evolve out of the 
country’s prior experiences in international politics. By means of a survey involving 
134 respondents, Hudson assessed the prevalence of foreign-policy action 
templates in three cultures—US, Japanese, and Russian (38, 37, and 59 
respondents respectively). Respondents were asked to suggest how they thought 
their governments would react in a given scenario (such as the violent break-up of a 
neighbouring state). Whereas within the US and Japanese contingents, there was 
                                                          
 8 Lebow (2008) went as far as to develop a ‘cultural theory of international relations’. However, 
as noted by Ling (2010), this theory essentially assumed that international politics was shaped 
by a single set of norms and values, viz. ancient Greek culture. 
 9 This is reminiscent of Kalevi Holsti’s ’national role conceptions’ (1970), later honed into a role-
theory for foreign-policy analysis by Walker (1987). 
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broad agreement as to which foreign-policy choice was the likely one for the 
respective government, the Russian responses varied widely. 
How foreign states are viewed by citizens and decision-makers is another area 
that has attracted scholarly attention (Geva and Hanson 1999; Lacina and Lee 2013; 
Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007; Wick 2014), notably in relation to threat 
perception (Jervis 1976; Rousseau 2006; Stein 1988). In his exploration of the 
reasons why certain foreign states are regarded as a threat by US citizens, Wick 
(2014) shows that the degree to which the particular state’s political culture tallies 
with that of the United States is a major factor in determining the extent of threat 
perception. Likewise, a number of experimental studies have highlighted the role 
of cultural similarity in shaping public perceptions of foreign states (Geva and 
Hanson 1999; Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007). Most of these studies, 
however, have focused solely on US perceptions and have not attempted a cross-
cultural account. Notable exceptions are the investigations conducted by the US–
China Security Perceptions Project, which looked at the attitudes and beliefs of the 
respective nations in regard to themselves and the other in the matter of security 
(Johnston and Shen 2015; Swaine et al. 2013). 
Relating more closely to cultural difference in the perception of events is the 
study by Bobrow et al. on international crisis (1977), the findings of which point up 
fundamental differences in the way such crisis is perceived by US and Chinese 
nationals. Both groups regard it as a time of great risk, but whereas Americans 
think of it mainly in terms of danger, Chinese also see it as an opportunity. 
Experimental evidence on foreign-policy event perceptions is also provided by 
Gries et al. (2009), whose findings tend to confirm the argument that shared 
history influences the evaluation and perception of events. Chinese and US 
respondents were given fictional high-school history textbook accounts of the 
Korean War. Details relating to the impact of the war, the sources used for the 
textbook, and the outcome of the conflict (in other words, whether it was 
described as a triumph or a tragedy for the country in question) were 
experimentally manipulated. When they had read the text, respondents were 
questioned on their beliefs about the past, their emotions, their collective self-
esteem, and their perception of present-day US–China relations in terms of threat. 
Significant differences emerged between the two nations both in their perceptions 
of the past and in their present-day values. The Chinese respondents showed 
higher levels of collective self-esteem and threat perception than those from the 
United States, suggesting the presence of cultural bias. 
As indicated by this review of the literature, many theoretical models and 
empirical accounts highlight the influence of culture on foreign-policy behaviour in 
terms of cognitive difference. None of them, however, has made a systematic 
attempt to assess the impact of cultural difference on the perception of foreign-
policy events—in other words, to determine whether one and the same event is 
perceived differently across national cultures. 
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3 Theoretical Approach 
Culture is one of the most debated concepts in the social sciences and one for 
which there is no common definition in the scholarly community.10 Suggestions 
from recent studies in cross-cultural and political psychology include: ‘a shared way 
to sample information’ (Triandis 2000: 146), ‘collective programming of the mind’ 
(Hofstede, Hosfstede, andMinkov 2010: 6), and ‘a preestablished [collective] set of 
behavioral competencies’ (Hudson 1999: 767). The implication of all these 
definitions is that national cultures have unique ways of perceiving their 
environment and evaluating the behaviour of others and that they have standard 
procedures for determining appropriate behaviour within the respective culture. In 
conceptualizing the impact of culture on the perception of foreign-policy events, I 
build on the work of Triandis (1989; 1994; 2000) and his notion that national 
cultures develop a shared convention for sampling information from the 
environment. In this scheme, individuals from different cultural backgrounds 
employ different sampling procedures, creating a cultural bias which may mean 
that they perceive the same event in different ways. The differences may relate 
either to which elements from an event are perceived or to the weight attached to 
the various elements of an event. 
For the specification of what constitutes a foreign-policy event, I build on event-
data research in international relations. Scholars of international politics 
conceptualize such events in terms of ‘who did what to whom (when and where)’ 
(see, for example, Schrodt 2012; Yonamine and Schrodt 2011). These events are 
seen as presenting information about the actors involved (‘source’ and ‘target’), 
who are connected through a particular action—specifically, a foreign-policy 
interaction. By way of example: if a media-report on the Hainan Island incident 
states that ‘on 1 April 2001, a Chinese fighter jet collided with a US surveillance 
aircraft in the airspace over the South China Sea’, China will be seen as the source, 
the United States as the target, and the collision as the action that connects the 
two.11 The rest of the statement is seen as supplying additional context (type of 
aircraft involved, place and time of event). To evaluate such events, scholars have 
developed scales for ranking them on a continuum from cooperation to conflict 
(Azar and Sloan 1975; Bond et al. 2003; Goldstein 1992; Shellman 2004). The scales 
are based on surveys in which foreign-policy experts were asked to decide whether 
and to what extent particular events were cooperative or conflictive. In a study by 
Goldstein, for example, experts rated 61 foreign-policy events on a scale ranging 
from -10 (most conflictive) to +10 (most cooperative). The events were described in 
very rudimentary, abstract terms: no context was provided and no real states or 
persons were mentioned. For example, experts rated the provision of economic aid 
by one state to another on average at +7.4 and the suspension of diplomatic 
relations between two states at -7. However, the intensity of perception in such 
surveys may be affected by the inclusion of additional information on the actors 
                                                          
 10 A survey conducted by Kroeber and Kluckhohn in 1952 already listed over 160 definitions. 
 11 Note that in this example the distinction between source and target is of no significance 
because their positions in the sentence could be reversed without altering the meaning of the 
event. 
Bethke  |  Cultural Bias in the Perception of Foreign-Policy Events 
 
 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 14 12 
 
 
featured or on the context. In terms of actors, the geographic proximity or distance 
between the source or target country and the respondent’s own country of origin 
may, for example, make a difference. And contextually, the degree of 
cooperativeness attributed to a grant of economic aid may be influenced by the 
amount involved. Moreover, there are a number of ways in which the cultural 
background of experts can influence perceptions of the degree of conflictiveness 
or cooperativeness of a foreign-policy event. 
First, the event itself may be differently weighted across national cultures. The 
Goldstein scale rests on the judgement of just eight International Relations 
scholars active at the University of Southern California in 1991—in other words, on 
the opinions of a small, highly homogeneous group of people from the same 
cultural background. Its view of what constitutes a major cooperative or conflictive 
event in international politics is therefore likely to be US-centric.12 As we have seen 
from the Hainan Island incident, however, an event—in this case an air collision—
may be seen as more conflictive by one party than the other, and this is true for all 
sorts of events in international politics. Culturally specific ways of sampling 
information are a product of the shared history of people living together as a 
group. Individuals form an opinion about a phenomenon on the basis of values that 
have become intrinsic to their own culture over time. Jervis (1976: 143) talks of ‘the 
assimilation of information to pre-existing beliefs’, in which individuals focus on 
aspects of a situation that are consonant with the ideas, beliefs, and values of their 
own culture and disregard those that are not. Culture, he argues, is one of the main 
drivers of such ‘perceptual predisposition’ (1976: 151). A shared past—including, 
most notably, formative historical events—thus influences the way in which 
national cultures sample information and perceive events. 
Second, perception of the actors involved in a foreign-policy event may vary 
between nations, intensifying or attenuating perception of the event itself. Such 
variation may arise as a result of the degree of cultural proximity between actor 
and observer: the conflictive event that occurred at Hainan Island, for example, 
may be perceived as having greater weight by an observer culturally closer to 
China. The variation may also be due to cross-cultural differences in collective self-
esteem or, more negatively, national narcissism. Collective self-esteem here 
implies the identification of the individual with the nation-state (as in ‘Being 
Chinese is an important part of who I am’) (Gries 2009: 227); national narcissism 
refers to something rather more extreme, defined by Cai and Gries (2013: 123) as 
‘an inflated view of the importance and deservedness of one’s own nation’ Both 
these traits may influence the intensity of conflictiveness or cooperativeness 
ascribed to foreign-policy events, the likelihood being that individuals from 
national cultures with high collective self-esteem or national narcissism will 
attribute greater weight to events where their own countries are involved. 
Third, national cultures may also differ in their perception of contextual factors. 
As mentioned previously in relation to Hainan Island, the fact that the US aircraft 
was a surveillance plane heightened the conflictiveness of the event in the eyes of 
the Chinese. Cultural differences of this kind are most likely to arise in cases where 
                                                          
 12 Other event-data scales (e.g. Azar and Sloan 1975) likewise rely on the judgement of experts 
from the same cultural background (i.e. US-American). 
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the relevant nations’ historical experience of the contextual factor in question 
diverge. Policy-makers’ use of historical analogy in assessing contemporary foreign-
policy events is well documented (Gries et al. 2009; Houghton 1996; Katzenstein 
1997). Hence, where a contextual factor triggers differing historical analogies 
across national cultures, perception of an event may, likewise, differ according to 
culture. 
My argument, in sum, is that cultural differences in the perception of a foreign-
policy event result from cultural differences in the ways that event is sampled. 
Differences in how the actors and context are perceived intensify or attenuate the 
observer’s view. The main mechanisms through which these differences in 
perception are produced are collective self-esteem and a perceptual predisposition 
resulting from the extrapolation of historical analogies. 
4 Case Selection 
To test for cultural influences on the perception of foreign policy events, this 
study uses a web-survey design. Experts from China and the United States are 
presented with fictional, experimentally manipulated foreign-policy scenarios in 
the form of news-agency reports and are invited to rate the events involved 
according to conflictiveness or cooperativeness. Three factors motivated the 
choice of the two countries involved: firstly, China-US relations are amongst the 
most important of our time politically, economically, and in terms of security; 
secondly, the national cultures of the two countries are generally held to be highly 
distinct; and thirdly, China and the United States differ in regard to the two main 
mechanisms which are here assumed to produce cultural bias in event perception—
namely, collective self-esteem and perceptual predisposition resulting from the 
extrapolation of historical analogies. 
Citizens of China and the United States are often described as differing widely in 
their ideas, beliefs, and value systems—in other words, in the elements that 
structure social interaction within their respective groups. Studies in cross-cultural 
psychology frequently cite the two countries as ideal-type antipodes in their 
explanations of cultural difference (Hofstede 2001[1980]; Nisbett 2003; Trafimow, 
Triandis, and Goto 1991). Triandis, for instance, names China and the United States 
as examples of collectivist and individualist cultures respectively (1995: 90) and 
argues that, faced with a particular event or situation of social interaction, people 
from individualist cultures mostly sample information about the individual whereas 
people from collectivist cultures sample information about the collective (Triandis 
and Suh 2002: 136). Empirical studies suggest that individualism is more prevalent 
in Western societies with high levels of industrialization and economic 
development whilst collectivism is more widespread in East Asia and the 
developing countries (Hofstede 2001[1980]; Kim et al. 1994). Most significantly for 
this study, research also suggests that Chinese citizens not only display greater 
collective self-esteem than do citizens of the United States (Gries et al. 2009: 449–
Bethke  |  Cultural Bias in the Perception of Foreign-Policy Events 
 
 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 14 14 
 
 
50) but also react more sensitively to foreign-policy scenarios when these involve 
their own country (Gries, Peng, and Crowson 2012).13 
In relation to extrapolation from the past, considerable differences in historical 
memory and national identity have also been identified between China and the 
United States. The dominant narrative of US foreign-policy is exceptionalism, in 
other words the notion that the United States is inherently different from other 
nations, notably in regard to the notions of freedom and liberty (e.g. Lipset 1997). 
The idea of exceptionalism has its roots in the American Revolution, which freed 
the country from British control. It is a feature which US presidents are expected to 
lay stress on at home, in their political agendas and the speeches they address to 
the general public. From the perspective of foreign policy, it is regarded by the 
United States as entitling it to a dominant role in world affairs. This entails the 
adoption of a missionary approach in relation to promoting both democracy (Smith 
2012) and market-oriented economic development (Williamson 1990). US foreign 
policy thus seeks to disseminate democratic norms and values across the world. 
The Bush Doctrine, as Monten points out (2005: 112), ‘[assumed] that U.S. political 
and security interests are advanced by the spread of liberal political institutions 
and values abroad’.14 Likewise, President Obama, though initially challenged for his 
lack of enthusiasm for American exceptionalism, and despite his milder rhetoric, is 
now recognized by scholars as having maintained the US commitment to the 
promotion of democracy both as a strategic goal of foreign policy and as a matter 
of national interest (Bouchet 2013; Carothers 2012). 
In relation to China, meanwhile, scholars point to a ‘victimization narrative’, 
which, they say, structures the ideational basis of the country’s foreign policy. In 
the words of Gries and Peng (2002: 175), this narrative portrays China as ‘suffering 
at the hands of the West during the “Century of Humiliation” from the mid-
nineteenth century Opium Wars to World War II’. Of crucial importance here, 
historically speaking, was the series of so-called ‘unequal treaties’ of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which forced China to cede sovereignty 
and territory to foreign powers such as Britain, Russia, the United States, and Japan 
(Wang 2005). Because of this historical experience, and the resultant victimization 
narrative, say the scholars, independence and autonomy became the cardinal 
principles of Chinese foreign policy after World War II (Chan 2012; Wang 2014) and 
a correspondingly strong emphasis was placed on the promotion of sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and non-interference in other states’ internal affairs. 
Given these differences, China and the United States are likely to constitute 
indicative comparison-cases as regards the analysis of cultural influences on the 
perception of foreign-policy events. If there are indeed cultural differences in the 
perception of such events, they are most likely to be found by comparing the 
evaluations of US and Chinese individuals. And if no difference is observed 
                                                          
 13 However, Cai and Gries (2013) argue that the two nations exhibit equally strong narcissistic 
feelings in regard to themselves. 
 14 The then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice launched the ‘Transformational Diplomacy’ 
initiative, the declared aim of which was to build and sustain democracy throughout the world 
(Rice 2006). 
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between the respective respondents, we may, conversely, take this as strong 
evidence that perception of foreign-policy events is universal in character. 
5 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire for the study was written in English and translated into 
Chinese. To ensure consistency between versions, a process of ‘back-translation’ 
was applied (Brislin 1986). This involved getting the questionnaire, along with 
invitation e-mails and other communications to participants, translated into 
Chinese by one professional translator and back into English by another. The 
second English version was then compared with the original and any 
inconsistencies resolved. The questionnaire is divided into three sections. 
The first section covers the demographic and geographic characteristics of the 
respondents. Questions about age and gender are followed by three geographic 
queries designed to capture respondents’ level of exposure to the relevant cultural 
values. Specifically, the geographic questions ask for country of birth, country in 
which highest level of education was completed, and current country of residence, 
thus making it possible to determine whether respondents have migrated at any 
stage and have therefore undergone major exposure to cultures other than their 
own. 
The second section is designed to assess the part played by cultural difference in 
the classification of abstract event-descriptions. The overall aim here is to 
determine whether understanding of the basic nature of foreign-policy events is 
universal or whether it varies across cultural groups. Respondents are asked to 
categorize 16 events as conflictive, neutral, or cooperative. The list of events (see 
Table 1)15 is taken from the scale developed by Azar and Sloan (1975) for the 
Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB). 
As Table 1 shows, the original scale lists events from most cooperative (two 
states uniting) to most conflictive (nuclear attack). To preclude the possibility of 
respondents’ being influenced by this ranking, the order of the events is 
randomized across questionnaires. The ‘sorting’ task involved here also serves the 
purpose of ‘calibrating’ the respondents, in the sense of making them aware of the 
range of foreign-policy events that occur in international politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 15 The original ranking was determined by 18 US IR scholars and practitioners, who assigned 
weights to each event. I use the expanded version of the scale, as developed by Beer et al. 
(1992). This includes an additional event involving attack with nuclear weapons. 
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Table 1: Events presented to respondents for classification 
 Nation A and Nation B unite voluntarily into one nation-state 
 Nations A and B establish an alliance (political, military or economic) 
 Nation A provides military support to Nation B (e.g. military aid, technical 
assistance, military intervention to support B) 
 Nation A provides economic aid to Nation B 
 Nation A establishes friendship or cultural agreements or exchanges with 
Nation B 
 Nation A issues a statement of support for Nation B’s policies 
 Nations A and B communicate, meet or propose talks regarding problems of 
mutual interest 
 Nation A demonstrates indifference to Nation B’s policies, moves, actions (e.g. 
makes no comment type statements) 
 Nation A expresses mild disaffection toward Nation B’s policies, objectives, 
goals, behavior 
 Nation A engages in verbal threats, warnings, demands and accusations 
against Nation B 
 Nation A uses its capabilities to counter Nation B’s actions (e.g. economic 
sanctions, troop mobilization) 
 Nation A breaks up diplomatic relations with Nation B 
 Nation A engages in small scale military acts against Nation B (e.g. border 
skirmishes, imposing blockades) 
 Nation A engages in limited war acts against Nation B (e.g. bombards military 
units or hits territory of B) 
 Nation A initiates or engages in extensive war acts against Nation B (many 
deaths, occupies territory) 
 Nation A uses nuclear weapons against Nation B 
 
In the third section of the questionnaire, respondents are asked to react to a 
series of vignettes describing various foreign-policy events. The protagonists and 
contexts of the events are manipulated experimentally. There are four vignettes in 
all, two depicting more conflictive events (economic sanctions and border 
violations) and two more cooperative ones (the provision of foreign aid and the 
conclusion of a trade agreement). The assumption here is that the differing 
historical experiences of the United States and China, and the distinct policies they 
have pursued, may influence respondents’ perceptions of the events in question. 
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Economic Sanctions 
The first of the vignettes deals with the imposition of economic sanctions by one 
state upon another. Two versions were designed—one abstract (mentioning only 
‘Nation A’ and ‘Nation B’) and one in which the target of the sanctions is the 
respondent’s birth-country (viz. either China or the United States). The texts of the 
two vignettes read as follows: 
Nation A announced sanctions against Nation B, targeting its energy, 
banking and defence sectors in the strongest action yet over the 
alleged mistreatment of Nation A’s citizens in Nation B. The 
measures mark the start of a new phase in the biggest confrontation 
between Nation A and Nation B in recent history. 
[China/USA] announced sanctions against [China/USA], targeting its 
energy, banking and defense sectors in the strongest action yet over 
the alleged mistreatment of [China/USA]’s citizens in [China/USA]. 
The measures mark the start of a new phase in the biggest 
confrontation between [China/USA] and [China/USA] in recent 
history. 
Respondents are randomly exposed to only one version of the sanction vignette 
and are asked to rank the event in question on an 11-point Likert scale ranging 
from ‘very cooperative’ (+5) through ‘neutral’ (0) to ‘very conflictive’ (-5). 
The abstract version allows one to assess whether Chinese and US respondents 
evaluate the same event differently. The historical experiences of the two 
countries in regard to sanctions differ. After World War II, the United States 
became an active imposer of sanctions on a whole variety of countries. For the 
duration of the Cold War, these measures, which encompassed a broad range of 
issues (from human rights to nuclear proliferation), were mostly unilateral in 
nature. Thereafter, however, the United States became more involved in 
multilateral sanctions-based efforts to influence other states’ policies. The USA 
itself, meanwhile, was rarely the target of economic sanctions; and even where it 
was, the measures had little effect (Hufbauer et al. 2007). This was in contrast to 
China, whose history in world politics after World War II was profoundly influenced 
by the experience of hard-hitting economic sanctions. From 1949 to 1970, it was 
the butt of export, import, and financial restrictions imposed by the United States 
as part of the latter’s Cold War strategy for containing communism. Similar 
sanctions were used against it from 1960 to 1970 by the Soviet Union, due to 
ideological disputes between the two countries. When the Cold War was over, the 
United States brought into play a new set of sanctions designed to effect change in 
Chinese human-rights policy, promote nuclear non-proliferation, and protect 
intellectual property rights. In general, the Chinese government has viewed 
economic sanctions as an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of communist rule 
and the political stability of the country (Drury and Li 2004; Zhang 2001b). Given 
this historical experience, it is likely that sanctions-related foreign-policy events 
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will be seen in a more conflictive light by Chinese observers than by their US 
counterparts. 
The inclusion of the country-specific version of the vignette is designed to throw 
light on the issue of collective self-esteem. If collective self-esteem or national 
narcissism affects event perception, respondents presented with the country-
specific vignette should see the event as more conflictive than do participants 
responding to the abstract scenario. The country-specific vignette also allows one 
to determine whether Chinese and US observers differ in their responses when 
their own country is the target of the sanctions. 
Border Violations 
The second vignette, on border violation, depicts an event involving the 
encroachment of one state’s airspace by another. Here again, two versions are 
proposed—an abstract one and a country-specific one in which the country 
suffering the encroachment is the respondent’s own country of birth: 
Nation A announced that military agencies had discovered a 
surveillance operation by Nation B over its air territory. Last week a 
plane owned by Nation B ‘accidently’ changed its route and flew over 
the southern border region of Nation A’s territory. Intelligence staff 
exposed the ‘accident’ as surveillance operation, which was 
presumably targeted at gathering highly sensitive information about 
Nation A's military technology. 
[China/USA] announced that military agencies had discovered a 
surveillance operation by [China/USA] over its air territory. Last 
week a plane owned by [China/USA] ‘accidently’ changed its route 
and flew over the southern border region of [China/USA]’s territory. 
Intelligence staff exposed the ‘accident’ as surveillance operation, 
which was presumably targeted at gathering highly sensitive 
information about [China/USA]’s military technology. 
Participants are randomly exposed to only one version of the vignette and are 
asked to rank the event on an 11-point scale ranging from ‘very cooperative’ to 
‘very conflictive’. 
It is likely that US and Chinese perceptions of this scenario will be influenced by 
the two countries’ ongoing dispute about airspace over the South China Sea. 
Because of China’s strong emphasis on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-
interference, Chinese respondents may prove more sensitive than their US 
counterparts to border violations and may therefore see the event depicted in the 
vignette in a more conflictive light than do the US observers. As in the last case, the 
country-specific version of the vignette serves as an indicator of collective self-
esteem, revealing whether respondents react more intensely when their own 
country of origin is involved. 
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Foreign Aid 
The third vignette concerns the provision of economic aid by one state to 
another. There are again two versions of the vignette, but in this case both are non-
specific as to country, the variation here being the presence or absence of 
conditionality: 
Nation A announced $220 million in macro-financial assistance to 
Nation B to support its economic stabilization. The measures are 
meant to help Nation B to cover urgent balance-of-payments needs. 
Nation A announced $220 million in macro-financial assistance to 
Nation B to support its economic stabilization. The measures are 
meant to help Nation B to cover urgent balance-of-payments needs. 
The assistance will be conditional on the implementation of 
austerity measures, structural reforms, and sound public finances. 
The same method is used—namely, random exposure to a single version with an 
11-point conflict/cooperation scale for responses. 
In foreign aid, as in economic sanctions, the historical experiences of China and 
the United States differ widely. The United States has long been established as a 
major player in the field of international development aid and has a lengthy record 
of multilateral and bilateral commitment. By contrast, China’s engagement as a 
provider of aid is a relatively recent phenomenon—though its emergence as one of 
Africa’s key donors over the last decade has been swift. As scholars have pointed 
out (Bräutigam 2011; Campbell 2008; Carmody and Owusu 2007), there are also 
substantial differences in the terms of Chinese and US aid, notably in regard to 
conditionality. Whereas US aid is generally conditional on structural reform, 
privatization, and the liberalization of the economy and the political system, 
Chinese assistance is generally given without condition. In line with the principles 
of state sovereignty and non-interference, the Chinese model of aid eschews the 
use of conditions relating to governance, democracy, human rights, or financial 
management.16 Chinese government officials have explicitly rejected the idea of 
attaching ‘any kind of political conditions to (…) aid and development projects’ (Liu 
Guijin, China’s special representative on Darfur cited in Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and 
Power 2010: 865). Given these differences, it is likely that Chinese and US foreign-
policy experts will have different perceptions of events involving foreign aid, 
particularly with regard to conditionality. 
 
                                                          
 16 According to some scholars, however, Chinese aid is not without its provisos: Vines et al., for 
example, argue that China makes its financial assistance conditional on preferential energy-
deals (Vines et al. 2009), and Zafar points to China’s habit of requiring recipient countries to 
endorse its ‘one China’ policy on Taiwan (Zafar 2007: 106). 
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Trade Agreements 
The fourth vignette casts respondents in the role of officials tasked with 
deciding, on behalf of their governments, whether their country should sign up to a 
treaty on international trade. Respondents must indicate how likely they would be 
to recommend joining. Unlike the other vignettes, this one is not original to the 
study. It is taken from a recent experimental enquiry into treaty ratification carried 
out by Emilie Hafner-Burton and colleagues (2014). The experimental treatment in 
this case is the inclusion/exclusion of an enforcement condition: one version of the 
vignette incorporates a formal enforcement mechanism, the other explicitly 
excludes it: 
You are deciding on behalf of the government whether to join a 
major new treaty on international trade. The treaty contains 
obligations that require signatories to lower tariffs and other barriers 
against trade with other countries that also join the treaty. If you join 
the treaty, your country‘s economic output could increase by a few 
percent in a decade, creating new jobs. Furthermore, in the future, 
the larger international markets created by the treaty may also 
create opportunities for local companies to sell profitable new 
products and services around the world. However, in the immediate 
term not everyone in your country will benefit if you join the treaty; 
some existing jobs could be lost, leaving some people unemployed. 
You will benefit more if many other countries join the treaty than if 
only a few join the treaty, as long as most countries comply with the 
agreement. The treaty does not provide any formal mechanism to 
punish countries that fail to comply. 
You are deciding on behalf of the government whether to join a 
major new treaty on international trade. The treaty contains 
obligations that require signatories to lower tariffs and other barriers 
against trade with other countries that also join the treaty. If you join 
the treaty, your country’s economic output could increase by a few 
percent in a decade, creating new jobs. Furthermore, in the future, 
the larger international markets created by the treaty may also 
create opportunities for local companies to sell profitable new 
products and services around the world. However, in the immediate 
term not everyone in your country will benefit if you join the treaty; 
some existing jobs could be lost, leaving some people unemployed. 
You will benefit more if many other countries join the treaty than if 
only a few join the treaty, as long as most countries comply with the 
agreement. An independent enforcement mechanism promptly 
and credibly punishes any country that does not comply by taking 
away some of the benefits of the treaty from the country that 
breaks the rules. 
As in previous vignettes, there is once again random exposure to a single version, 
but here respondents are asked to indicate how likely they are to recommend 
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joining the treaty, as measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 0–20% (highly 
unlikely) through 21–40% (fairly unlikely), 41–60% (could go either way), and 61–
80% (fairly likely) to 81–100% (almost certain). 
Scholars of international politics generally see the inclusion of enforcement 
mechanisms in international agreements as helping to foster cooperation between 
states (Axelrod 1984; Keohane 2005). From their analysis of a convenience sample 
of US government officials, Hafner-Burton et al. (2014), for example, conclude that 
the presence of such a mechanism increases the readiness of foreign-policy makers 
to sign up to a treaty. Interstate cooperation via trade agreements, it is argued, is 
more credible and more sustainable where the agreement in question includes an 
independent enforcement mechanism penalizing any state that violates its 
provisions. However, scholars also point to cultural differences between China and 
the United States in this area (Hufbauer, Wong, and Sheth 2006; Tung 2014). Most 
notably, the inclusion of enforcement conditions in trade agreements runs counter 
to the Chinese foreign-policy goals of sovereignty and non-interference. It is 
therefore likely that Chinese and US respondents to the questionnaire will react 
differently when the experimental treatment of enforcement is applied, with US 
participants more likely to recommend signature if enforcement is included and 
Chinese participants more likely if it is not. 
6 Survey design 
The target population for the present study comprises foreign-policy experts 
employed in think-tanks in China and the United States. As previous studies on 
foreign-policy decision-making have shown, politicians in these two countries rely 
heavily on advisers when they have important decisions to make (Abb 2013; 
Easterly 2014; Jacobs and Page 2005). Think-tank experts are routinely asked to 
provide assessments of the state of world affairs in general or of situations in 
specific regions (the security situation in the Middle East, for example). Such 
experts thus literally shape politicians’ perception of the world. 
Identification of the target population for the survey was made using the 2013 
edition of the ‘Global Go To Think Tank Index’ (McGann 2014), a worldwide think-
tank ranking.17 Only think-tanks with a significant foreign-policy focus—in other 
words, those that had a department specializing in foreign policy and/or 
international politics—were considered. The study population thus comprises not 
all think-tank staff in China and the United States, but only foreign-policy experts 
working for the most relevant think-tanks in the two countries.18 Thirty appropriate 
bodies were identified for the United States and only 10 for China. The top 10 in 
the American list were therefore chosen to serve as the comparison group. For 
each think-tank, the personnel who could be regarded as specializing in foreign 
policy were identified and a database of their names and e-mail addresses was 
compiled. This produced a total of 730 US and 270 Chinese experts. Invitations to 
                                                          
 17 Compiled on the basis of an open nomination process and a final grading by an expert panel. 
 18 Additional information for the Chinese sample was obtained from the comprehensive review 
of Chinese foreign-policy think-tanks carried out by Abb (2013). 
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participate in the survey were then sent out to all 270 Chinese experts and a 
random sample of 270 US experts. 
The questionnaire was administered to both US and Chinese experts in March 
2015.19 Personalized pre-notification letters were sent out at the start of the 
month, both as a way of alerting the potential respondents to the upcoming survey 
and in order to establish the credentials of the Centre for Global Cooperation 
Research as the study’s sponsor. The mailing was part of a broader-based 
marketing campaign by the Centre and included information on the latter’s 
activities, fellowship programme, and publications. The actual e-mail invitations for 
the web-survey were sent out ten days later and all addressees from whom a 
completed questionnaire had not been received within the following week were 
sent an e-mail reminder. As an incentive, a $10 Amazon gift coupon was offered to 
every addressee completing the survey.20 
A total of 68 US and 54 Chinese respondents completed the questionnaire.21 
There are a number of geographic and demographic variations between the two 
groups. The Chinese sample exhibits only a small gender imbalance (57.4% male, 
42.6% female) compared with the proportions in the US sample (82.3% male, 17.7% 
female). There is also a small variation in age, the mean for Chinese and US 
respondents being 40 years and 48 years respectively. The respondents’ migration 
histories also varies: all the Chinese respondents were born in China and still live 
there, with only 6 of the 54 having spent time abroad to obtain their highest-level 
educational qualification. The US sample is more diverse in terms of cultural 
background, with 19 respondents having been born abroad and 12 having obtained 
their highest-level educational qualification outside of the United States. 
7 Empirical analysis 
Classification of Foreign-policy Events 
Here, respondents are asked to classify events from the COBDAP list as 
conflictive, neutral, or cooperative. Overall, there is a high degree of agreement 
between the US and Chinese categorizations (see Fig. 1), exceeding 90 per cent for 
most of the events on the list (11 out of 16). The event on which opinions vary most 
widely is ‘Nation A expresses mild disaffection toward Nation B’s policies, 
objectives, goals, behavior’: 66 per cent of respondents classify it as neutral, 26 per 
                                                          
 19 To test the functionality of the questionnaire, a pre-test involving 40 respondents was carried 
out in September 2014. The respondents were all drawn from the permanent staff and 
visiting scholars at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research and could therefore be 
regarded as having expertise in foreign policy. 
 20 Although provision of an e-mail address was required to receive the coupon, and 
identification was therefore theoretically possible, the survey was essentially anonymous. 
 21 Two respondents in the original sample gave what were clearly spurious replies and were 
excluded from the analysis: one claimed to be 100 years old and, amongst many other things, 
classified a military attack as a cooperative event; the other selected the mid-scale option 
throughout, for events and vignettes alike. 
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cent as conflictive, and 8 per cent as cooperative. Agreement is also lower in regard 
to ‘Nations A and B communicate, meet or propose talks regarding problems of 
mutual interest’, which 78 per cent of respondents classify as cooperative and 22 
per cent as neutral. In neither of these events, however, is any pattern of cultural 
differences in categorization detectable. What the classification question therefore 
indicates overall is that respondents from China and the United States generally 
agree in their perception of foreign-policy events as conflictive, neutral, or 
cooperative. 
Figure 1:  Coincidence in the categorization of foreign-policy events 
 
Events most frequently categorized as 
conflictive/neutral/cooperative are displayed in black/grey/white 
respectively. 
Responses to Vignettes 
In attempting to establish whether there are any significant differences between 
Chinese and US perceptions of the events depicted in the vignettes, the study 
applies the same method of analysis in all four cases. Average ratings are calculated 
for four groups of respondents: 1) US treatment; 2) US control; 3) China treatment; 
4) China control. This allows one both to identify any Chinese–US differences in 
event-ratings and to assess the reactions of Chinese and US respondents to the 
experimental manipulations. 
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Vignette 1: Economic sanctions 
The results for the sanctions vignette are summarized in Fig. 2, which shows the 
mean conflict/cooperation scores across the different groups of respondents. From 
these it appears there are no substantial differences between Chinese and US 
respondents in their perception of the sanctions-related events. The average score 
across all respondents is -3.1. A comparison of respondents’ ratings for the abstract 
scenario reveals that although on average the Chinese participants perceive the 
event as more conflictive than do their US counterparts, the difference—a mean of 
-3.3 for the Chinese sample as compared to -3 for the US sample—is not 
statistically significant. Cross-cultural comparison of the results for the country-
specific scenario is not indicative, since the sender and receiver of the sanctions 
differ in the versions of the vignette presented, respectively, to US and Chinese 
respondents. In relation to the effects of the experimental manipulation within 
groups, meanwhile, Fig. 2 suggests no significant differences: whether respondents 
are presented with an abstract or a country-specific scenario makes no difference 
to the perceived degree of conflictiveness of the event either in the US or in the 
Chinese group. Overall then, the results tend both to suggest that sanctions are 
perceived in the same way across cultural groups and to contradict the idea that 
collective self-esteem/narcissism play an important role in the perception of events 
of this kind. 
Figure 2:  Perception of sanctions 
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Vignette 2: Border violation 
The results for this vignette are summarized in Fig. 3. Here again, there appear to 
be no substantial differences in the US and Chinese perceptions of the event 
depicted. On average respondents give a rating of -2.4 for this event. Comparison 
of the ratings for the abstract scenario show that, on average, the US respondents 
perceive the event as slightly more conflictive than their Chinese counterparts (-2.4 
compared with -2.2). With regard to the country-specific scenario: as in Vignette 1, 
sources and targets differ in the US and Chinese versions, rendering cross-cultural 
comparison inappropriate. The experimental treatment has no significant effect on 
respondent ratings in either of the cultural groups: perception of the 
conflictiveness of the event is not influenced by the nature—abstract or country-
specific—of the framing. 
Figure 3: Perception of border violation 
 
Bars = mean score for different groups of respondents, spikes = 
associated 95% confidence intervals. 
As with the previous vignette, the results point to a common perception, across 
cultures, of the event in question—in this case border violation. And collective self-
esteem/narcissism once again appears to have minimal influence on event 
perception. 
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Vignette 3: Foreign aid 
The experimental manipulation applied in the foreign-aid vignette involves the 
inclusion/exclusion of conditionality. The results are summarized in Fig. 4.  
Figure 4: Perception of foreign aid 
 
Bars = mean score for different groups of respondents,  
spikes = associated 95% confidence intervals 
Differences in perception across national cultures appear to be more marked 
here than in the case of the other vignettes. The overall average 
conflict/cooperation rating for this event is 2.8. In the version where no 
conditionality is specified, the average rating for US respondents is 3 and for 
Chinese respondents 3.6. Although this indicates that Chinese respondents 
perceive unconditional aid as more cooperative than do their US counterparts, the 
difference—as evidenced by the significant overlap in confidence-intervals—is not 
statistically significant.22 Turning to the conditional version, we see the opposite 
picture: the mean conflict/cooperation rating for the US sample is 2.6 and for the 
Chinese sample 1.9 and despite a slight overlap in confidence intervals here, the 
overall difference is statistically significant.23 This means that, where the provision 
of foreign aid is conditional, it is perceived as significantly more cooperative by US 
respondents than by Chinese respondents. Fig. 4 also reveals how each national 
culture responds to the experimental manipulation. Within each culture, those 
                                                          
 22 The t-statistic for difference in means across the two groups is -1.61(df=60) with a p-value of 
0.11. 
 23 The t-statistic for difference in means across the two groups is 2.1(df=54) with a p-value of 
0.04. 
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respondents who are presented with the conditional scenario rate the event as less 
cooperative than those presented with the unconditional version. The effect of the 
manipulation, however, is only statistically significant in the case of the Chinese 
sample, where it far exceeds the difference in the US group. The average rating for 
the vignette amongst Chinese respondents is 2.7. The mean values for Chinese 
ratings of the unconditional and conditional scenarios are, as previously indicated, 
3.6 and 1.9 respectively. This difference of 1.7 points on an 11-point scale is 
considerable. Although both the US and Chinese responses to the experimental 
treatment point in the same direction, they differ in their magnitude. Thus, the 
results confirm the notion that cultural difference plays a part in the perception of 
foreign aid in general and of conditionality in particular. 
Vignette 4: Trade agreements 
The results of the scenario in which respondents are asked to comment on the 
likelihood of their recommending joining a trade agreement are presented in Fig. 5. 
It should be remembered, as mentioned previously, that responses are given on a 
5-point scale, so that the vertical axis here represents not actual percentages but 
converted scores ranging from 1 (0–20%, highly unlikely) to 5 (81–100%, almost 
certain). As the graphic indicates, the average rating for the scenario of a trade 
agreement without enforcement varies across national cultures. On average, 
Chinese respondents are more likely than their US counterparts to recommend 
signing up to such an agreement, with the difference in mean values across the 
cultural groups being statistically significant.24 The opposite is the case for the 
scenario with enforcement-mechanism, where US respondents are more likely to 
recommend joining than Chinese participants—though here the difference in 
rating is not statistically significant.25 The experimental manipulation thus appears 
to affect the US and Chinese respondents in different ways, with enforcement 
enhancing the likelihood of treaty signature amongst US respondents and 
decreasing it amongst Chinese respondents. Only amongst the US sample, 
however, is this effect statistically significant.26 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 24 The t-statistic for difference in means across the two groups is -2.71(df=54) with a p-value of 
0.01. 
 25 The t-statistic for difference in means across the two groups is 1.3(df=59) with a p-value of 
0.2. 
 26 For the Chinese sample, the t-statistic for difference in means across the two treatment 
conditions is 1.04(df=49) with a p-value of 0.3, and for the US sample -3(df=64) with a p-value 
of 0.003. 
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Figure 5: Perception of trade agreements 
 
Bars = mean score for different groups of respondents,  
spikes = associated 95% confidence intervals 
The results are thus similar to those in the previous vignettes: they tend to 
confirm the notion that cultural difference influences the perception of foreign-
policy events in general and of enforcement in particular. 
Robustness of Results 
Although, for the sake of clarity, the results are here presented in the form of a 
simple comparison of average ratings for different groups of respondents, they will 
in fact readily withstand more sophisticated statistical analysis. They remain 
substantially the same when, for example, regression models are applied that 
control for age and gender of respondents, or when a reduced sample of US 
respondents is used, selected for similarity of cultural exposure (i.e. born and 
educated in the United States). The Chinese–US differences in response to the 
experimental manipulations involving conditionality and enforcement are, likewise, 
reproduced when use is made of two-way analysis of variance or if interaction 
terms are included in regression models. 
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8 Discussion 
The empirical analysis provides a number of interesting insights into the issue of 
cultural difference in the perception of foreign-policy events. The results suggest, 
for example, that Chinese and US foreign-policy experts largely agree on the 
overall nature of such events—in the sense of whether they are cooperative, 
neutral, or conflictive. Likewise with regard to sanctions and border violations, the 
results indicate no cultural difference between the Chinese and US experts in their 
perception of these events. Even where the expert has some connection to one or 
other of the countries involved in the event, this appears not to influence their 
perception: neither Chinese nor US respondents vary in their assessment when the 
scenario presented to them is country-specific. The idea that collective self-
esteem/narcissism significantly influences perception is therefore not supported 
by these results. One area in which cultural difference does appear to influence 
perception, however, is foreign aid. Where this is presented as conditional, US 
experts view it as significantly more cooperative than do their Chinese 
counterparts. In addition, the influence which the experimental manipulation with 
conditionality exerts within the two groups differs: amongst the Chinese experts, it 
is very strong, with aid being seen as markedly less cooperative if it is made 
conditional on structural adjustment and austerity-measures; amongst the US 
experts, by contrast, the presence or absence of conditionality makes little 
difference to perception. Cultural difference also makes itself felt in the 
perception of trade agreements. Presented with an agreement that does not 
include an enforcement mechanism, the Chinese experts are, on average, more 
likely than the US respondents to recommend signing up. At the same time, 
application of the enforcement manipulation produces opposite effects within the 
two groups: amongst the Chinese respondents, enforcement decreases the 
likelihood that they will recommend joining; amongst the US respondents it 
enhances it. 
The results of the study suggest that previous theoretical models of the effects 
of culture on foreign policy need to be reconsidered. None of the experimental 
manipulations relating to collective self-esteem had a significant effect on the 
perception of the scenarios involved—neither the US nor the Chinese assessments, 
for example, appeared to be influenced by the identity of the actors involved. This 
suggests, contrary to earlier findings (Cai and Gries 2013; Gries et al. 2009), that 
collective self-esteem and national narcissism do not, after all, affect the 
perception of foreign-policy events. What did produce differences of perception, 
however, was manipulation of the variables of conditionality (in foreign aid) and 
enforcement (in trade agreements), both of which are tied up with the notions of 
sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. The study therefore indicates 
that although the difference in the historical experiences of the United States and 
China in regard to foreign-policy issues rarely influences these countries’ general 
perception of events, extrapolation from the past is of significance when it comes 
to contextual factors. The contextual factors cited may thus have triggered 
different historical analogies for the Chinese and US respondents. 
The findings relating to the vignette on trade agreements also add to previous 
research on this topic. As already indicated, the study was able to replicate the 
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results obtained by Hafner-Burton et al. (2014) in their work with US policy-makers. 
Thus, the US experts surveyed for the present study also responded to the 
presence of an enforcement mechanism with an increased willingness to join the 
agreement. This demonstrates the transferability of the findings from policy-
makers to experts and thus also bolsters the external validity of the original study’s 
findings. On the other hand, the results for the Chinese experts in the present 
study do not support the argument that enforcement mechanisms in trade 
agreements are conducive to interstate cooperation: whether or not such a 
mechanism was included in a treaty was of little importance to the Chinese cohort 
and, if anything, made them less likely to sign up to it. This suggests that the effect 
of enforcement mechanisms is not transferable across national cultures. 
The study’s findings hold two specific implications for policy. The first relates to 
the South China Sea: given that the perceptions of relevant US and Chinese experts 
as to what constitutes a conflictive or cooperative foreign-policy event appear to 
coincide, and that the two groups also seem to agree as to the degree of 
conflictiveness/cooperativeness involved in each case, actual conflict between the 
two nations in this region is, in all likelihood, preventable. Despite the harsh 
rhetoric on both sides, it would appear that the relevant actors have a common 
understanding of the situation and are thus in a position not only to avoid the sort 
of conflict that is prompted by misperception but also to negotiate a compromise 
on the main points of contention. Second: given the differences in the way US and 
Chinese experts perceive contextual factors (in this case conditionality and 
enforcement), achieving global cooperation on public goods is likely to be a 
challenge. If the key players in international politics do not agree on the 
mechanisms needed to achieve such cooperation, the task becomes a complicated 
one. 
Finally, two caveats are in order in regard to this study’s findings. The first 
concerns the target population for the survey and the fact that this should, ideally, 
be drawn from actual policy-makers. Although experts exert considerable influence 
on politicians, they are not the ones who ultimately take the decisions on foreign 
policy. Because many of the relevant studies from political psychology and foreign-
policy analysis have been conducted under laboratory conditions and have involved 
students or ordinary citizens, scholars have cast doubt on the validity of their 
findings—in other words, how well these ‘travel’ into actual (foreign) politics (Stein 
2013: 372). Although the move to a survey-population of foreign-policy experts 
represents an improvement in terms of external validity, further research is needed 
in order to determine whether officials, political decision-makers, and ordinary 
citizens exhibit the same patterns of perception as do the experts surveyed in this 
study. It may be that foreign-policy experts constitute a distinct epistemic 
community, in the sense of a transnational network of knowledge-based experts, 
and that—as argued by Haas—they are therefore related by a shared set of 
normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, a common notion of validity 
(shared criteria for validating knowledge), and a common policy enterprise (Haas 
1992). If this is so, the crucial driver of the perception and misperception of 
foreign-policy events may be not common cultural background but professional 
circumstance—that is to say, membership of the community of foreign-policy 
experts. The second caveat relates to scope: the results of the present study offer 
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insight into patterns in event perception across different groups of respondents; 
they do not provide any evidence as to how these patterns (for example, the 
differing US and Chinese perceptions of enforcement) come about. Further 
research is necessary to throw light on the mechanisms that produce such effects. 
This could take the form of a follow-up study in which explorative or interpretive 
interviews are conducted with the survey respondents in order to establish why 
their perceptions of the events and/or experimentally manipulated scenarios 
varied as they did. 
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